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Abstract—In cognitive radio networks, cooperative spectrum
sensing (CSS) has been a promising approach to improve sens-
ing performance by utilizing spatial diversity of participating sec-
ondary users (SUs). In current CSS networks, all cooperative SUs
are assumed to be honest and genuine. However, the presence of
malicious users sending out dishonest data can severely degrade
the performance of CSS networks. In this paper, a framework
with high detection accuracy and low costs of data acquisition at
SUs is developed, with the purpose of mitigating the influences
of malicious users. More specifically, a low-rank matrix comple-
tion based malicious user detection framework is proposed. In the
proposed framework, in order to avoid requiring any prior in-
formation about the CSS network, a rank estimation algorithm
and an estimation strategy for the number of corrupted channels
are proposed. Numerical results show that the proposed malicious
user detection framework achieves high detection accuracy with
lower data acquisition costs in comparison with the conventional
approach. After being validated by simulations, the proposed ma-
licious user detection framework is tested on the real-world signals
over TV white space spectrum.
Index Terms—Cooperative spectrum sensing, low-rank matrix
completion, malicious user detection, TV white space.
I. INTRODUCTION
S PECTRUM sensing, a promising solution to identify po-tential spectral holes, is one of the most challenging tasks
in cognitive radio (CR) networks [1]. Cooperative spectrum
sensing (CSS) is an effective approach to offer significant per-
formance gain in detecting spectrum holes, by exploiting the
spatial diversity of collaborative secondary users (SUs) [2], [3].
However, due to the openness of low-layer protocol stacks, CSS
networks are vulnerable to attacks from spectrum sensing data
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falsification (SSDF) [4]. This characteristic of CSS networks
blocks the application of CR techniques in large-scale networks.
In CSS networks, SUs that launch SSDF attackers are called
malicious users. The main goals of malicious attacks come from
two aspects: 1) decreasing detection probability for disturbing
the normal operation of PUs; and 2) increasing false alarm prob-
ability to deprive access opportunities for honest SUs [5]. In
decentralized CSS networks, sensing results are exchanged be-
tween neighboring SUs to improve the network reliability to link
failure. However, this characteristic makes decentralized CSS
more vulnerable to malicious attacks [6], as the observations at
honest SUs are also available to malicious users during the in-
formation exchanging and convergence process. Furthermore,
corrupted data can be integrated into the decisions of honest
neighbor SUs, which eventually brings significant performance
degradation to the whole CSS network [7]. In centralized CSS
networks, all SUs report their local sensing data to a fusion
center (FC), where the final decision on spectrum occupancy is
made. By doing so, all participating SUs, including malicious
users, can only obtain the spectrum occupancy knowledge from
the FC. Thus, observations at honest SUs in the CSS network
would not leak to malicious users directly. However, as the cor-
rupted data are still considered in the decision making process,
the existence of malicious users may lead to incorrect decisions
at the FC. Generally, regardless of the types of malicious attack
and CSS network, malicious users pose significant challenges
to the security in CSS networks. Therefore, accurate malicious
user detection is essential to guarantee the security of CSS net-
works.
Along with improving the security of CSS networks through
malicious user detection, another key challenge in attempting
to build CSS networks comes from the need to reduce data
acquisition costs at SUs. Due to the well-known Nyquist sam-
pling theorem, sampling rates should be no less than twice the
signal bandwidth. However, as the SUs are normally energy-
constrained, their sensing capabilities are normally limited as
well. Thus, it is difficult to achieve such high sampling rates for
wideband spectrum sensing at energy-constrained SUs. Addi-
tionally, as the spectrum is normally underutilized in reality [8],
[9], the signal spectrum exhibits a sparsity property [10] in the
frequency domain. It is further noted that this sparsity prop-
erty can be transformed into a low-rank property of the matrix
constructed by spectral signals received at spatially distributed
SUs [11], since nearby locations or adjacent channels share the
similar spectrum occupancies [12]. Matrix completion (MC)
techniques [13] can be applied to recover the complete matrix
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with only partial of the items observable. Specifically, by invok-
ing MC technique at the FC, SUs in a CSS network need to sense
fewer channels, as the unsensed channels can be reconstructed
from the sensed channels based on the low-rank property. As a
result, the data acquisition costs are significantly reduced at SUs.
A. Related Work
So far, malicious user detection has been widely researched
for enhancing the security of CSS networks [14]–[23]. Specifi-
cally, the performance of CSS networks with single and multiple
malicious users were investigated by Wang et al. [14]. Here, the
suspicious level of each SU as well as consistency values were
calculated based on historical reports from SUs, in order to re-
duce the influences of malicious users. Min et al. [19] proposed
to safeguard the detection process by checking the consistency
among sensing reports and and removing the abnormal sensing
reports. Chen et al. [15] proposed a reputation-based mechanism
to defend against malicious attacks. However, these historical-
data-based algorithms take a long time to build a reliable repu-
tation. Kaligineedi et al. [16] proposed a robust outlier detection
method to identify malicious users that keep sending high val-
ues regardless of the spectrum occupancies, by utilizing outlier
factors and spatial information about SUs. The shadowing cor-
relation between SUs were exploited in [17] to detect reports
manipulated by malicious users. Kalamkar et al. [18] proposed
an outlier detection scheme to detect malicious users which send
true or false power values randomly. Penna et al. [20] proposed
a Bayesian method to detect and counteract attacks in CSS net-
works by considering the attack probability at each participating
SU. Malicious users are assumed to send the false reports and the
achieved performance is better than schemes based on exclusion
of the malicious users. Duan et al. [21] proposed two attack-
prevention mechanisms with direct and indirect punishments.
Furthermore, some work has been carried out on attack detec-
tion from intelligent malicious users. Li et al. [22] proposed
an abnormality-detection approach for secure CSS networks, in
which the intelligent attack strategy adopted by malicious users
is unknown. Wang et al. [23] designed an incentive compatible
mechanism to thwart malicious behaviors. By doing so, the pro-
posed approach was more practical to be implemented in CR
networks.
As well as the existing work on malicious user detection,
MC-based CSS networks have been studied [12], [24]–[29],
with the purpose of alleviating the costs of data acquisition at
SUs. Meng et al. [24] introduced the concept of MC to CSS net-
works. In [24], each SU linearly combines the information on
multiple channels at sub-Nyquist sampling rates. Subsequently,
each SU sends a small number of such linear combinations to an
FC for MC. Li [12] applied a belief propagation framework to
MC to make the spectrum reconstructing more implementable
and efficient in the wideband CSS networks. Qin et al. [25]
proposed a robust wideband spectrum sensing algorithm for TV
white space (TVWS), with sub-Nyquist sampling performed at
each SU in the considered CSS networks. Once the compressed
measurements are sent to the FC, nuclear norm minimization
is adopted to solve the low-rank MC problem [26], [27]. By
doing so, the costs of data acquisition at SUs are reduced signif-
icantly. For spectrum allocation over TVWS, the geo-location
database approach can provide the spectrum occupancy infor-
mation for secondary usage. By utilizing the information from
the geo-location database, a prior information assisted wideband
spectrum sensing algorithm was proposed in [28], with the pur-
pose of improving the detection performance and reducing the
costs of data acquisition at SUs. Additionally, Qin et al. [29]
proposed to remove the corrupted samples at the FC with sub-
Nyquist sampling rates at SUs. However, rank of the matrix at
the FC and malicious user number are assumed to be known in
advance in the considered CSS networks. The two strong as-
sumptions make the malicious user detection algorithm difficult
to be implemented in dynamic CSS networks. Moreover, the
transmission cost from SUs to the FC is high as all the collected
measurements are transmitted to a FC, which is inefficient or
even unaffordable for large-scale networks.
B. Motivation and Contribution
The aforementioned methods [14]–[23] have played a vi-
tal role and laid a solid foundation to foster new strategies
for malicious user detection. However, many of these methods
are trust-based, which uses historical information on malicious
users’ behaviours. In practice, reliable reputation information is
not always available, since well-established historical statistics
may be too expensive or even unrealistic in a fast-changing CR
environment. Additionally, intelligent malicious users sending
random false values, but very close to the true ones, are more
challenging than the types of malicious users that always send
very high or very low values [16], [18]. Motivated by these find-
ings, a malicious user detection method, dealing with malicious
users sending values that are random but within the range of
true power values reported by cooperative SUs, is desirable for
secure CSS networks. Another motivation of our work comes
from the need to reduce data acquisition costs at SUs without
loss of any information. The aforementioned MC-based CSS
methods [12], [24]–[26], [28], [29] focus on reducing the costs
of data acquisition at SUs without considering any security is-
sues or require high data transmission cost in CSS networks.
Therefore, a malicious user detection algorithm with energy
efficiency at SUs is strongly needed, but challenging.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which
invokes the MC technique to achieve malicious user detection
without prior information about the CSS networks. The primary
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
 A malicious users detection framework is proposed based
on low-rank MC. In the proposed framework, only part
of the whole spectrum is sensed without degrading the
recovery performance, as the unsensed channels can be
recovered from the sensed channels at the FC by invoking
a MC technique. Consequently, the data acquisition costs
at SUs are reduced in comparison with the CSS networks
without MC.
 At the FC, channels which are sensed but corrupted by
malicious users are removed during the MC process, by
utilizing the adaptive outlier pursuit (AOP) algorithm [30],
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[31]. Therefore, malicious users are removed before mak-
ing final decisions on spectrum occupancies.
 A rank estimation algorithm is proposed to provide the rank
as one of the inputs for the proposed malicious user detec-
tion algorithm. By doing so, the proposed framework does
not require any prior information about spectrum sparsity
for malicious user detection.
 An estimation strategy for the number of channels cor-
rupted by malicious users is proposed. With the new strat-
egy, the estimated number of corrupted channels can be
used as one of the inputs for the proposed malicious user
detection algorithm to ensure that the proposed framework
is completely blind to the CSS network.
 The proposed framework is tested on real-world signals
over TVWS after being validated by simulated signals.
Numerical results show that the proposed malicious user
detection framework achieves high detection accuracy with
lower data acquisition costs at SUs, in comparison with the
conventional CSS algorithms.
C. Organizations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the CSS network model with malicious users. Section III
presents our proposed malicious user detection framework along
with the proposed rank estimation algorithm and the estimation
strategy for the number of corrupted channels. Section IV shows
the numerical analyses of the proposed malicious user detection
framework on both simulated and real-world signals. Section V
concludes this paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL OF COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING
WITH MALICIOUS USERS
A. Network Description
We take a typical CSS scenario as the considered network
model, as shown in Fig. 1(a). It is assumed that the whole
spectrum of interest with bandwidth D can be divided into I
channels. A channel is either occupied by a PU or unoccupied.
There is no overlap between different channels. The number of
occupied channels K is assumed to be much less than the total
number of channels, i.e. K  I. Each channel is sensed by a
set of SUs which are spatially randomly distributed at different
J locations. At an arbitrary location indexed by j (1 ≤ j ≤ J),
it is assumed that a set of Bj (1 ≤ Bj ≤ I) SUs are deployed
to sense the spectrum of interest. Within each set of SUs, SUs
are indexed by b (1 ≤ b ≤ Bj ).
In a conventional CSS network, the whole spectrum is sensed
by one SU at each location, which results in Bj = 1 and J SUs
deployed in the CSS network in total. However, high sampling
rates are challenging for SUs to achieve wideband spectrum
sensing, as the SUs are normally energy-constrained with lim-
ited sensing capabilities. In this paper, we propose to deploy
a set of SUs at each location (i.e. Bj > 1), where each SU is
adjusted to sense different channels among the whole spectrum
at Nyquist rates. This can be achieved by equipping each SU
with a bandpass filter. Additionally, the whole spectrum is not
Fig. 1. Network model.
fully sensed by the deployed SU set at each location. As shown
in Fig. 1(a), only part of the whole spectrum are sensed by Bj
SUs at the j-th location, and each of the SU is labelled as SUbj .
In other words, at each location, each channel is sensed by one
SU at most, and some of the channels are not sensed by any
SU. Consequently, the costs of data acquisition at SUs can be
reduced significantly, in comparison with the case that each SU
senses the whole spectrum.
After sampling is performed, each SU calculates the power
values of the sensed channels, and then sends this information
to an FC to contribute to the final decisions on spectrum occu-
pancies. It is further noticed that some of the SUs experience
deep fading or shadowing. They would send very low power
values to the FC in a CSS network regardless of the spectrum
occupancies, which are labelled as blocks with ‘+’ in Fig. 1(a)
and Fig. 1(b). The transmit signal has a sparsity property in the
frequency domain [10] and the nearby locations are assumed to
share the similar spectrum occupancies [12], so the matrix con-
structed by the received signals at different locations exhibits a
low-rank property [11]. Fig. 1(b) illustrates the transformation of
the sparsity property of transmit signals into the low-rank prop-
erty of the matrix at the FC, where the matrix is constructed
by signal powers of the sensed channels received at different
locations. In such a CSS network, we need to reconstruct the
unsensed channels from the sensed channels by a low-rank MC
technique.
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In the case of a sensing malfunction, some SUs in the CSS
network send corrupted power values to the FC, labelled as
the blocks with ‘X’ in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b). Malicious users
appear randomly in the considered CSS network to corrupt a
random number of channels at random locations. Malicious
users that keep sending high power values or low power values
are easily detected. However, malicious users sending values
that are random but very close to the true values are much more
difficult to detect, which is the case we consider in this paper.
We propose to remove these malicious users during the MC
process at the FC. Otherwise, recovery performance at the FC
would be degraded significantly as the corrupted power values
are used for the MC.
B. Signal Processing Model
Let us define si (t) ∈ CN×1 to be the signal transmitted over
the i-th channel, where N refers to the number of samples at
the Nyquist sampling rate. It is assumed that only the primary
signals are transmitted in the spectrum of interest. Additionally,
rij (t) refers to the signals over the i-th channel received by the
SU at the j-th location, which is given by
rij (t) = d
−χ/2
j hij si (t), (1)
where dj refers to the distance from PUs to the receiver at the
j-th location, χ is defined as the propagation loss factor, and hij
follows independent Rayleigh distribution which is assumed to
be time-invariant within one sensing period.
Once signals over the i-th channel rij (t) are received at an
SU at the j-th location, the power of the sensed channel pij can
be calculated as
pij =
1
N
N∑
n=1
|rij [n]|2 , (2)
where rij [n] refers to the discrete sampling of rij (t). The com-
plete matrix PΩ constructed by signals received at J different
locations can be illustrated as
PΩ =
⎡
⎢⎣
p1,1 · · · p1,J
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
pI,1 · · · pI,J
⎤
⎥⎦
I×J
(3)
where the i-th row of PΩ represents the power values of the i-th
channel sensed by SUs located at the different J locations. The
the j-th column of PΩ refers to the power values of different
channels sensed by the Bj SUs at the j-th location. Here, Ω is
defined as the index set of complete matrix PΩ .
As the whole spectrum of interest is not fully sensed by the
set of SUs at each location in the considered network, the matrix
constructed by the power values available at the FC is incomplete
and labelled as PE . The item pEij in PE can be expressed as
pEij =
{
pij if (i, j) ∈ E
0 otherwise
(4)
where E, a subset of Ω, denotes the index set for sensed channels
at different locations. The elements in E and the number of
elements in E are both random. We denote the average number
of elements in E as E {|E|} and γ = E{|E |}|Ω | . Here, |Ω| refer to
the number of items in E and Ω, respectively. Specifically, pEij
can also be expressed as
pEij =
{
pij w.p. γ
0 w.p. 1− γ. (5)
We define O as a subset of E to denote the index set for
the sensed channels from honest SUs at different locations. We
assume that a sensed channel is from a honest SU with probabil-
ity κ. Then it is obvious that κ = E
{
|O |
|E |
}
. If SUi,j decides to
corrupt the measured channel power pij , it will generate a cor-
rupted power value. Then with the existence of malicious users,
the power of an arbitrary sensed channel can be expressed as
p˜ij =
{
τ
(
pEmax − pEmin
)
+ pEmin w.p. 1− κ
pij w.p. κ
(6)
where τ ∼ U (0, 1) follows a standard uniform distribution with
minimum 0 and maximum 1, pEmin and pEmax refer to the min-
imum and maximum power values of the sensed channels, re-
spectively. More specifically, pEmin refers to the power value of
the vacant channel, and pEmax refers to power value of the occu-
pied channel, which can be known at SUs according to historical
information.
With malicious users appearing in the CSS network, the in-
complete matrix PE becomes sparsely corrupted, labelled as
PEC . Then the item pECij in PEC can be expressed as
pECij =
{
p˜ij w.p. γ
0 w.p. 1− γ. (7)
III. PROPOSED MALICIOUS USER DETECTION FRAMEWORK
In order to enhance the security of the CSS network, a mali-
cious user detection framework based on low-rank MC is pro-
posed. Based on the network model described in Section II-A,
each SU is proposed to sense only part of the spectrum rather
than the whole spectrum, in order to reduce costs of data ac-
quisition at each SU. Additionally, we propose to remove the
power values of corrupted channels at the FC by invoking the
AOP algorithm [30]. It is further noted that the rank of the matrix
at the FC and the number of channels corrupted by malicious
users is normally unknown in reality, but are required by the pro-
posed malicious user detection algorithm with AOP. To make
the proposed malicious user detection framework completely
blind, a rank estimation algorithm and an estimation strategy on
the number of corrupted channels collected at the FC are pro-
posed. As a result, the malicious user detection framework does
not require any prior information about the CSS network. Once
the exact matrix is obtained by the proposed framework, spec-
trum occupancies can be determined by a conventional energy
detection method [32].
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Fig. 2. Illustration for the corruption index matrix Λ, with ‘1’ for uncorrupted
channels and ‘0’ for corrupted channels received at the fusion center.
A. Malicious User Detection Algorithm Based on Matrix
Completion
With malicious users appearing in a CSS network, power
values of the sensed channels are partly corrupted, affecting the
accuracy of recovery of sensed channels at the FC. As attacks can
be launched by any malicious SU participating the CSS network,
corrupted power values are assumed to be sparsely and randomly
distributed among the collected values at the FC. The indices of
the corrupted power values are unknown to the FC. Additionally,
in order to make attacks more difficult to detect, each malicious
user may distort the power of an arbitrary channel to a value
that is close to the true power. In such a case, the malicious user
detection problem can be formulated as follows:
PˆΩ , Λˆ = arg min
PΩ ,Λ
1
2
∑
(i,j )∈Ω
Λij
((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
s.t.
∑
(i,j )∈Ω
(1−Λij ) ≤ L, Λij ∈ {0, 1}, (8)
where PˆΩ is the recovered matrix, and the number of corrupted
power values collected at the FC is L, where is unknown and
to be discussed in the following. Binary matrix Λ denotes the
uncorrupted channels at different locations by 1, i.e. Λij = 1 if
(i, j) ∈ O for channel i at the j-th location, and the corrupted
channels by 0, which is illustrated in Fig. 2.
It is noted that problem (8) is non-convex, since it has both
continuous and discrete variables. The following two steps can
be performed to find a local optimal solution to (8):
1) Fix Λ and update PΩ . If (i, j) /∈ Ω, Λij ((PΩ )ij − pECij )2
in (8) becomes zero. Therefore, PˆΩ can be obtained by
solving the simplified problem
PˆΩ = argmin
PΩ
∑
(i,j )∈Ω
((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
. (9)
This problem can be easily solved by Riemannian trust-
region for MC (RTRMC) [33].
2) With fixed PΩ , Λ can be updated by solving
Λˆ = argmin
Λ
∑
(i,j )∈Ω
Λij
((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
s.t.
∑
(i,j )∈Ω
(1−Λij ) ≤ L,Λij ∈ {0, 1} . (10)
The problem (10) is to choose (I × J − L) elements with
least sum from SΩ =
{((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
, (i, j) ∈ Ω
}
.
Given Γ as the L-th largest item in SΩ , Λij can be updated
as
Λij =
{
1 if (i, j) ∈ Ω,
((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
< Γ
0 otherwise.
(11)
During the process of solving problem (8), the power values for
those corrupted channels are removed from the observed ones
at the FC to alleviate the recovery errors caused by malicious
users. Once the recovered matrix Pˆ Ω is obtained at the FC,
spectrum occupancies are determined by comparing the energy
of each channel with a predefined threshold. Particularly, the
i-th channel is determined as occupied if its energy is higher
than the empirical threshold λd as given by
λd =
(μ
2
)2
, (12)
where μ =
∥∥∥vec
(
PˆΩ
)∥∥∥
1
/∥∥∥vec
(
PˆΩ
)∥∥∥
0
refers to the av-
erage absolute value of all the J ×K nonzero elements in
vec
(
PˆΩ
)
[11]. Here, vec (·) stacks all columns of matrix PˆΩ
into a long vector. The final binary decisions d = (d1 , . . . , dI)
on spectrum occupancies can be determined as
di =
⎛
⎝ 1
J
J∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
|pˆij | ≥ λd
⎞
⎠ , ∀i (13)
where pˆij is the reconstructed power value of the i-th channels
sensed by the SU at the location j.
The proposed malicious user detection algorithm is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1. The maximal number of iterations for
solving (8) is predefined as Imax . At the l-th iteration, Λl is
used to identify the corrupted power values based on the newly
constructed
(
PΩ
)l
. Then the indices for the uncorrupted power
values are updated to be 1 and the other items are indexed by
0 in order to remove the corrupted values during the matrix
completion process. This iterative process continues until the
index set for the uncorrupted power values is same as that in the
last iteration. It should be noted that malicious users that send
both corrupted and uncorrupted power values are not removed
completely during the iterative recovery process. Only the cor-
rupted values are removed, which maximizes the number of
uncorrupted measurements collected at the FC to achieve better
recovery performance. After the complete matrix is recovered,
final decisions on spectrum occupancies d are made according
to (13). As demonstrated in Algorithm 1, the rank of the matrix
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL. 66, NO. 1, JANUARY 1, 2018
Algorithm 1: Proposed Malicious User Detection Algo-
rithm.
Input: Ω, Mˆ sensed channels, Imax > 0, L ≥ 0, K > 0.
Initialization: l = 1, Λij = 1 for (i, j) ∈ Ω, O0 = Ω.
1: while l < Imax do
2: Update
(
PΩ
)l
with RTRMC as in (9);
3: Update Λl with (10);
4: Update Ol to be indices in Ω where Λlij = 1;
5: if Ol = Ol−1 then
6: PˆΩ =
(
PΩ
)l ;
7: Break;
8: end if
9: Update l = l + 1;
10: end while
11: pˆij =
(
PˆΩ
)
ij
.
12: Calculate threshold λd .
13: Make final decisions d on spectrum occupancies
by (13).
14: return d.
K and the number of corrupted power values L are required as
the inputs at the FC. However, the two kinds of prior information
are normally unknown in reality. Therefore, we propose a rank
estimation algorithm and an estimation strategy for the number
of corrupted channels collected at the FC, to enable the proposed
malicious user detection framework. The details of the proposed
algorithm and strategy are introduced in the following two parts.
B. Rank Estimation Algorithm
Rank estimation can be converted into a sparsity order es-
timation problem, as the sparsity property of a signal can be
transformed into a low-rank property of a matrix constructed
by signals received by SUs at different locations [11]. With the
sensed channels observed at the FC, rank of a matrix can be
estimated using the following two steps:
1) The reconstructed complete matrix P¯Ω for rank order
estimation can be obtained by solving
P¯Ω = argmin
PΩ
∥∥vec
(
PΩ
)∥∥
1 s.t. A
(
PΩ
)
= PEC
(14)
where A is an operator from Ω to Ω/E, and the AIC
sampler [34] is taken in this paper. Here, the sparsity level
of vec
(
P¯Ω
)
is equal to J ×K.
2) The estimated rank Kˆ is given by
Kˆ =
I∑
i=1
⎛
⎝
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
J
J∑
j=1
p¯ij
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ λr
⎞
⎠ (15)
where λr is a threshold for the rank estimation, and p¯ij
refers to the items in P¯Ω . By applying data fusion at the
FC, the power value of each channel is then calculated by
averaging power values of the same channel received by
spatially distributed SUs.
It has been proved that exact signal recovery can be guar-
anteed when the number of sensed channels is no less than
α (K × J) log (I/K) + β [35]. However, the number of sensed
channels that guarantees exact rank estimation and exact signal
recovery are different. When Monte Carlo simulation and sta-
tistical curve fitting techniques are adopted to find the values of
the constants α and β, the following two results can be obtained
with given I, J and K:
Result 1: Successful rank estimation can be guaranteed when
the number of sensed channels is not less than M1 , which is
defined as follows:
M1 = α1(Kmax × J) log (I/Kmax) + β1 (16)
where Kmax is the statistical upper bound of K, α1 and β1 are
experimental values provided in [36].
Result 2: Successful signal recovery can be guaranteed when
the number of sensed channels is not less than M , which is
defined as follows:
M = α2 (K × J) log (I/K) + β2 (17)
where α2 and β2 are also experimental values provided in [36].
Normally, the historical spectrum occupancy Kmax is used as
a statistical upper bound of rank K, which is utilized to deter-
mine the minimal sampling rates at SUs in order to guarantee
exact signal recovery. In practice, spectrum occupancies are dy-
namic, which makes the statistical value Kmax not suitable for
the practical spectrum occupancy. One possible scenario is that
Kmax is much larger than K, which leads to that the number of
data values collected for the rank estimation being much more
than that for exact signal recovery. As a result, it is a waste of
data acquisition costs at SUs. Another scenario is that Kmax is
much smaller than K, which leads to inexact signal recovery
as the number of collected data is insufficient for successful
signal recovery. In order to obtain the exact rank of the matrix
at the FC, we propose a rank estimation algorithm to get Kmax
adaptively.
In the proposed rank estimation algorithm, for the scenario
that Kmax is much larger than K, a shrink algorithm is pro-
posed to update Kmax , as shown in Algorithm 2. In the l-th
iteration, Ml1 is calculated by (16) with Klmax . Additionally, the
complete matrix can be obtained by (14) with the Ml1 number
of sensed channels, and then Kˆl can be determined by (15). Ad-
ditionally, the number of sensed channels Ml required for exact
recovery is obtained by (17). Subsequently, Ml2 is updated as
Ml2 = M
l −Ml1 , and Kl+1max is obtained by deducting the step
size Δ1 from Klmax . This iterative process is repeated until
Ml2 > 0 or the maximal iteration number Itermax is reached.
The outputs of Algorithm 2 are the updated Kmax and Kˆl .
Because of the over-utilizing of Algorithm 2 caused by un-
suitable step size Δ1 , output Kmax from Algorithm 2 can be-
come smaller than the real rank K. This leads to an M1 that
is insufficient for the exact rank estimation Kˆ. As illustrated
in Algorithm 3, an enlargement algorithm is proposed to en-
large Kmax until exact rank estimation can be achieved. The
outputs of Algorithm 2, Kmax and Kˆl , are taken as inputs of
Algorithm 3. In the l-th iteration, Kl+1max is updated by adding
step size Δ2 to Klmax . Subsequently, the updated Ml1 is deter-
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Algorithm 2: Proposed Shrink Algorithm.
Input: PEC , Δ1 , Kini , Itermax , and λr .
Initialization: l = 1, Klmax = Kini , Ml2 < 0.
1: while Ml2 < 0 or l ≤ Itermax do
2: Calculate Ml1 with Klmax by (16);
3: Calculate Kˆl by (14) and (15) with Ml1 channels;
4: Calculate Ml with Kˆl by (17);
5: Calculate Ml2 = Ml − Ml1 ;
6: Update Kl+1max = Klmax −Δ1 and l = l + 1.
7: end while
8: return Klmax , and Kˆl .
Algorithm 3: Proposed Enlargement Algorithm.
Input: PEC , Δ2 , Kmax , Kˆl , λr , Itermax and ε.
Initialization: l = 1, Kˆlmax = Kmax .
1: while
∣∣∣Kˆl −Klmax
∣∣∣ ≤ ε or l ≤ Itermax do
2: Update Kl+1max = Klmax + Δ2 and l = l + 1;
3: Calculate Ml1 with Klmax by (16);
4: Calculate Kˆl by (14) and (15) with Ml1 channels.
5: end while
6: return Kˆl = Klmax .
Fig. 3. Procedure of the proposed rank estimation algorithm.
mined by (16) to achieve exact rank estimation. Additionally, Kˆl
is determined by (14) and (15). This iterative process continues
until the difference between Klmax and Kˆl becomes less than
the error tolerance ε or the maximal iteration number Itermax
is reached. The updated Kmax is taken as the output of the
proposed rank order estimation, and used for the rank input to
Algorithm 1.
The whole process of the proposed rank estimation algorithm
is illustrated in Fig. 3. Once the algorithm starts with the inputs,
the updated Klmax and Kˆl obtained by (15) are returned as the
outputs of Algorithm 2. Subsequently, Algorithm 3 is triggered
if the difference between Kˆl and Klmax is no less than the
error tolerance ε. The Kˆl is returned until the stop condition is
satisfied or the maximal iteration number Itermax is reached.
C. Estimation Strategy on Number of Corrupted Channels
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, the number of corrupted chan-
nels L collected at the FC is required as one of the inputs.
However, L is usually unknown and needs to be estimated.
Therefore, an estimation of the number of channels corrupted
by malicious users L is required. However, if the estimated
number of corrupted channels Lˆ is smaller or greater than its
real value L, the performance of Algorithm 1 will be degraded
significantly. More specifically, if Lˆ is underestimated, some of
the corrupted channels will still be used to perform MC at the
FC, which will definitely result in recovery errors in the recon-
structed matrix. If Lˆ is overestimated, some of the uncorrupted
channels will be removed during the MC process, and there-
fore the MC process would result in more than one solution,
as no enough uncorrupted measurements are available for MC.
Consequently, exact MC is difficult to achieve as the number of
available uncorrupted channels may be insufficient.
As proved in [30], a sufficient condition for the non-
uniqueness of a matrix PΩ is given as follows: suppose the
number of sensed channels is Mˆ , and they are randomly dis-
tributed among the complete matrix PΩ ∈ CI×J . Let us define
ΔL as the difference between the overestimated number of cor-
rupted channels Lˆ and the real number of corrupted channels
L. If ΔL > (Mˆ−L)max(I,J ) −K > 0, then the reconstructed matrix
is non-unique.
In the proposed framework, an initial guess L0 for the number
of channels corrupted by malicious users is used as one input for
Algorithm 1. It is an iterative process to update the number of
corrupted channels in combining with Algorithm 1. In each iter-
ation, after Algorithm 1 is performed, the value of the Lˆth largest
term in set SΩ =
{((
PΩ
)
ij
− pECij
)2
, (i, j) ∈ Ω
}
should be
checked. If it is less than a predefined tolerance ltol , Lˆ is deter-
mined to be overestimated, and some of the removed channels
are uncorrupted. The numerical analyses in [30] has proven that
ΔL can be bounded by (lmin −K), where lmin is defined as the
minimum number of sensed channels in one row or one column
of the incomplete matrix with
(
Mˆ − L
)
elements at the FC.
More specifically, let us define lˆmin as the minimal number of
sensed channels in one row or one column of the incomplete
matrix with
(
Mˆ − Lˆ
)
elements. If lˆmin is less than the rank
K, the estimated number of corrupted channels Lˆ is updated as
Lˆ = Lˆ + lˆmin −K. If lˆmin is no less than K and
(
pij − pECij
)2
is less than Γ, the exact matrix is reconstructed. Consequently,
the iterative process for MC is terminated. Otherwise, if lˆmin is
greater than K and
(
pij − pECij
)2 is greater than Γ, Lˆ is consid-
ered to be underestimated. As a result, the value of Lˆ should be
updated to be ρ1Lˆ, where ρ1 > 1 is a properly selected constant.
The updated Lˆ is then taken as one input for the MC process
in the next iteration until the exact matrix is recovered or the
iteration number reaches its upper bound Imax .
With the proposed rank estimation algorithm and the num-
ber of corrupted channel estimation algorithm described above,
the whole procedure of the proposed malicious user detection
framework with low-rank MC can be summarized as shown in
Fig. 4. Within this framework, it is worth noting that the exact
recovery cannot be achieved if the number of sensed channels
Mˆ is smaller than M1 . In this case, the FC should coordi-
nate SUs in the CSS network to sense more channels until
Mˆ ≤ M1 .
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Fig. 4. Whole procedure of the proposed malicious user detection framework
based on low-rank matrix completion.
D. Data Acquisition Costs and Computational Complexity
If the whole spectrum of interest is entirely sensed by the set
of SUs at each location, the number of sensed channels obtained
at the FC is Mˆ = I × J . In such as case, a complete matrix is
available at the FC. Otherwise, if only part of the whole spectrum
is sensed, only an incomplete matrix can be constructed at the
FC with Mˆ < I × J . Herein, the compression ratio can also
be defined as γ = MˆI×J , which is the ratio of the number of the
sensed channels Mˆ in the incomplete matrix PE to the total
number of channels I × J in the complete matrix PΩ at the
FC.
Without invoking the MC technique, the total number of chan-
nels to be sensed at J different locations in the CSS network
is Mˆ1 = I × J , regardless of the presence of malicious users.
Additionally, considering a MC based CSS network without
malicious users, in order to make sure the complete matrix can
be recovered exactly at the FC, the minimal number of channels
to be sensed is
Mˆ2 = γmin × I × J (18)
where γmin is the lower bound of compression ratio to guarantee
exact MC, which is dependent on the rank K of the matrix to
be recovered and the MC solvers. Furthermore, for the CSS
network with the presence of malicious users considered in
this paper, with invoking Algorithm 1, the minimal number of
channels to be sensed is
Mˆ3 = γˆmin × I × J (19)
where γˆmin ∈ [γmin , 1] is the minimal compression ratio that
can be achieved by Algorithm 1. The exact value of γˆmin is
dependent on the rank K and the channel corruption ratio κ.
Here, the channel corruption ratio κ = LI×J is defined as the
ratio of the number of corrupted channels L to the total number
of channels (I × J) to be sensed in the considered CSS network.
When there is no malicious user in the CSS network, i.e., κ = 0,
we have Mˆ2 < Mˆ1 . With the presence of malicious users, i.e.,
κ > 0, we have Mˆ3 ≥ Mˆ2 . Meanwhile, Mˆ3 ≤ Mˆ1 according
to the definition of Mˆ3 in (19). Therefore, no matter whether
malicious users exist in the CSS network, if MC is invoked
at the FC, the number of channels that needs to be sensed is
less than the case without invoking MC technique. As a result,
the data acquisition costs can be significantly reduced by the
proposed malicious user detection framework, in comparison
with the conventional malicious user detection method.
Complexity of the proposed malicious user detection frame-
work lies in two parts: i) rank estimation; and ii) malicious
user detection. For the rank estimation part, the computational
complexity is O
(I3J3), which comes from solving the l1-
norm minimization. For the malicious user detection part,
the computational complexity mainly comes from step 2 in
Algorithm 1. In each iteration of Algorithm 1, the computational
complexity of solving step 2 is O
((
Mˆ + I + J
)
K2 + IK3
)
.
As a result, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is bounded by
O
(
Imax
((
Mˆ + I + J
)
K2 + IK3
))
. Due to the low-rank
property of the matrix at the FC, the value of matrix rank, K, is
usually small, which leads to an acceptable complexity.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSES
In this section, numerical analyses of the proposed malicious
user detection framework are presented. The proposed frame-
work is tested on both simulated and real-world TVWS signals.
In the simulation, the total number of channels is I = 40,
which is the number of TVWS channels in the UK. Each channel
is either fully occupied by a PU or vacant. The locations of PUs
are randomly distributed among the spectrum of interest. Here,
the size of a CSS network refers to the number of different
locations J where SUs are implemented in that CSS network.
In simulation settings, the size of a CSS network changes from
small scale (J = 1) to large scale (J = 400). The power values
of corrupted channels p˜ij are assumed to be random within the
range of [pEmin , pEmax]. Without considering channel fading, pEmax
is normalized as 1 which refers to the power values of occupied
channels, and pEmin is 0 indicating that the channel is vacant. In
the simulation, with considering the channel fading and different
compression ratios, the values of pEmax and pEmin can be variable
in each trial. The maximal number of iterations for Algorithm 1
is Imax = Itermax = 200. The step size is Δ1 = Δ2 = 1, and
ε = 1.
A. Numerical Results Using Simulated Signals
In this subsection, simulation results of the proposed frame-
work are illustrated by using the simulated signals.
1) Results of Proposed Rank Estimation Algorithm: The
saved sampling costs, which refer to the saved number of chan-
nels to be sensed for guaranteeing exact MC, is shown in Fig. 5
with increasing number of sensing periods and dynamic spec-
trum occupancies. In this scenario, varying spectrum occupan-
cies result in changing the rank K of the matrix at the FC.
Therefore, the upper bound Kmax of the rank should change
accordingly. The rank change points are marked by circle in
Fig. 5. Here, the two-step compressive sensing based spectrum
sensing algorithm (TS-CS-SS) [36] utilizing fixed Kmax is il-
lustrated as the benchmark. The same initial value for Kmax
is used for both TS-CS-SS and the proposed rank estimation
algorithm. Therefore, the sampling costs saved by these two al-
gorithms are same at the initial sensing period in Fig. 5. When
the sparsity of the spectral signals changes, the saved sampling
costs caused by TS-CS-SS algorithm keep constant as Kmax
is fixed. However, exact MC cannot be guaranteed if Kmax is
much smaller than K, or extra data acquisition costs are caused
if Kmax is much larger than K. For the proposed rank estima-
tion algorithm, the saved sampling costs is degraded at each
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Fig. 5. Saved sampling costs with varying spectrum occupancies.
Fig. 6. Detection probability Pd of the proposed malicious user detection
framework with different estimation accuracy ratios ρ and channel corruption
ratios κ. The compression ratio is γ = 100%, and network size is J = 40.
change point in order to guarantee exact MC. However, the
saved sampling costs are increased gradually after the sparsity
change point. The proposed rank estimation algorithm guaran-
tees exact MC in dynamic spectrum occupancy environment,
with the extra burden on sampling in comparison with the TS-
CS-SS algorithm. In practice, spectrum occupancy is assumed
to be the stable within several periods. Therefore, the proposed
rank estimation algorithm is reliable for practical scenario, as
it can adjust Kmax to be closer to the real rank K after a few
periods of the K change point. More accurate estimation of K
makes the proposed algorithm outperform TS-CS-SS in terms
of the saved sampling costs with guarantee on exact MC.
2) Results of the Case With Unknown Number of Corrupted
Channels: In Fig. 6, the influences of the incorrect estimation on
the number of corrupted channels Lˆ = ρL are analyzed. Here,
ρ, named as estimation accuracy ratio, is defined as the ratio
of the estimated number of corrupted channels Lˆ to the actual
number of corrupted channels L. In this case, we choose J = 40
and K = 1 to simplify the simulation process. Additionally, the
estimated number of corrupted channels Lˆ = ρL varies from
0.7L to 1.3L. It is shown in Fig. 6 that detection probability
Pd of the proposed malicious user detection framework gets de-
graded when the estimated number of corrupted channels Lˆ is
Fig. 7. Detection performance comparison between the proposed method and
various benchmarks versus malicious user ratio κ. Compression ratio is γ = 1.0,
matrix rank is K = 1, and network size is J = 40.
overestimated, i.e. ρ > 1, especially in the case with high level
of channel corruption ratio, i.e. κ ≥ 0.5. It is further noted that
Pd would only be degraded slightly if the number of corrupted
channels Lˆ is underestimated. In the following simulations, by
invoking the proposed estimation strategy for the number of cor-
rupted channels, the correct estimation of the corrupted channels
Lˆ is taken as one input of Algorithm 1.
3) Results of the Proposed Malicious User Detection Frame-
work: Fig. 7 shows the verification of our proposed method for
its effectiveness of dealing with malicious users. Here, we pro-
vide curves for the following four approaches:
 Approach 1: spectrum sensing without malicious users,
labelled by ‘×’ in the figure.
 Approach 2: with the existence of malicious users, signal
recovery is performed by solving the nuclear norm opti-
mization problem as adopted in [25] for the multiple nodes
case. It is labelled by ‘’ in Fig. 7.
 Approach 3: with the existence of malicious users, our
proposed malicious user detection method is adopted to
remove malicious users during matrix recovery process. It
is labelled by ‘◦’ in Fig. 7.
In this scenario, the number of active PUs in the spectrum of in-
terest is 1, which results in the rank of matrix at the FC as K = 1.
Compression ratio is γ = 1.0 to avoid any performance degrada-
tion caused by insufficient number of collected measurements at
the FC. By comparing the curves for approach 1 with approach
2, we can observe that the detection performance is degraded
when malicious users attack the system. This is because that the
collected measurements used for signal recovery at the FC are
corrupted by malicious users, which leads to inaccurate signal
recovery. With invoking our proposed method, i.e., approach 3,
it can be noted that the detection performance is improved sig-
nificantly in comparison with approach 2, which validates the
effectiveness of our proposed framework. It is also worth noting
that the detection performance degrades when more channels
are corrupted by malicious users.
In order to further illustrate how malicious users influence the
signal recovery accuracy, we also provide a comparison on the
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Fig. 8. Recovery accuracy comparison between the proposed method and
traditional compressive spectrum sensing approach versus malicious user ratio
κ. Compression ratio is γ = 1.0, matrix rank is K = 1, and network size is
J = 40.
Fig. 9. Corrupted channel detection probability versus malicious user ratio κ.
The compression ratio is γ = 1.0, matrix rank is K = 1, and network size is
J = 40.
relative recovery error achieved by approach 2 and approach 3
as specified above. Here, the relative recovery error is defined
as
‖Pˆ Ω −P Ω ‖22
‖P Ω ‖22
. As shown in Fig. 8, we can see that the relative
recovery error achieved by the traditional compressive spec-
trum sensing approach, i.e., approach 2, is much higher than
our proposed approach, i.e., approach 3. This is caused by the
existence of malicious users. When these corrupted values are
included in the measurements to perform signal recovery at the
FC, the recovery error increases. The more channels are cor-
rupted by malicious users, the worse recovery accuracy can be
achieved. When our proposed malicious user detection approach
is adopted to remove those corrupted measurements during the
process of recovery ordinal matrix, the recovery accuracy is
increased significantly. This result matches with the detection
performance trend shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 9 plots the probabilities of detecting the corrupted chan-
nels as corrupted (Pd) and that of incorrectly classifying un-
corrupted channels as corrupted (Pf ) versus channel corruption
Fig. 10. Detection probability Pd of the proposed malicious user detection
framework with different channel corruption ratios κ. The compression ratio γ
is 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0, respectively. Here, network size is J = 40.
ratio κ. In order to eliminate any possible influence caused by an
insufficient number of measurements at the FC, the compression
ratio is γ = 1.0 in this case. From the figure, we can observe
that the probability of incorrectly classifying the uncorrupted
channels increases with higher κ. The reason is that with higher
κ, the number of uncorrupted power values collected at the FC
is reduced, which results in inexact MC. It is also worth not-
ing that probability that the corrupted channels are successfully
removed during the MC process decreases with increasing κ,
which is caused by the inexact MC at the FC as well. We can
further note that as more uncorrupted channels are determined
as corrupted and removed during the MC process, the number
of uncorrupted values used for the MC is further reduced. As a
result, the recovery performance of MC degrades.
Fig. 10 plots the detection probability Pd of the proposed
malicious user detection framework versus channel corruption
ratio κ. It is worth noting that the detection probability Pd of the
proposed malicious user detection framework decreases when
more channels are corrupted by malicious users in the consid-
ered networks. Specifically, we can observe that when channel
corruption ratio is increased to 0.6, the detection probability Pd
is heavily degraded regardless of the compression ratio. It is
reasonable as the number of uncorrupted values is insufficient
to guarantee exact MC at the FC.
Fig. 11 illustrates how the detection probability Pd of the pro-
posed malicious user detection framework varies against chan-
nel corruption ratio κ under different network sizes J . With
a fixed κ, the number of corrupted channels L increases with
larger network size J , as the channel corruption ratio is defined
as κ = LI×J and I is fixed to be 40. Additionally, as labelled
with black ovals in Fig. 11, for the two cases with J = 200
and J = 400, if κ is 0.4 and 0.2, respectively, the number of
corrupted channels becomes the same L = 3200. Similarly, as
labelled with black ovals in Fig. 11, for the cases with J = 40
and J = 200, if κ is set to 0.5 and 0.1, the number of corrupted
channels L = 800 becomes the same. In these two considered
scenarios, we notice that detection probability Pd of the CSS
network with large size is higher than that with smaller size
when the number of corrupted channels is fixed. This supports
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Fig. 11. Detection probability Pd of the proposed malicious user detection
framework with different channel corruption ratios κ. The network size J is 40,
200, and 400, respectively. The compression ratio is γ = 1.0, and matrix rank
is K = 4.
Fig. 12. Detection probability Pd of the proposed malicious user detection
framework with different matrix ranks K and different channel corruption ratios
κ. The compression ratio is γ = 1.0, and network size is J = 400.
the proposition that the higher spatial diversity of the CSS net-
work (i.e., larger CSS network size), the better defense against
the same number of corrupted channels.
In Fig. 12, the detection probability Pd of the proposed mali-
cious user detection framework is presented with different chan-
nel corruption ratios κ and different ranks K. The rank K of the
matrix is determined by the number of active PUs in the spec-
trum of interest. The positions of the active PUs are randomly
generated in the spectrum of interest. In this case, the com-
pression ratio γ is set to 1.0 to avoid any possible performance
degradation caused by an insufficient number of sensed channels
at the FC. We can see that the detection performance improves
with decreasing rank K of the matrix as well as decreasing
channel corruption ratio κ. This observation is reasonable, as
exact MC requires more observed measurement at the FC with
increasing rank K and channel corruption ratio κ.
B. Numerical Results Using the Real-World Signals
The UK regulator Ofcom has conducted a series of trials
on the TVWS pilots [37], [38]. One of the trials has been
Fig. 13. Measurement setup for collecting real-world data at Queen Mary
University of London.
Fig. 14. Detection probability Pd and false alarm probability Pf of the pro-
posed malicious user detection algorithm using real-world signals with different
compression ratios γ , and K = 9.
carried out at Queen Mary University of London. There are
I = 40 channels over TVWS in total, ranging from 470 MHz to
790 MHz. Each TVWS channel is with bandwidth of 8 MHz.
Among these TVWS channels, channel 27 is generally vacant,
whose frequency ranges from 518 MHz to 526 MHz. During
the measurement, channel 27 was randomly corrupted by Dig-
ital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial (DVB-T) signals, which are
generated and transmitted temporarily by the setup shown in
Fig. 13(a). Real-world signals over TVWS are collected by
a portable RFeye node as shown in Fig 13(b). As shown in
Fig 13(c), there are 8 channels being occupied by PUs, includ-
ing channel 22, 23, 25, 26, 28-30, and 33. When the trial signal
is transmitted, as labelled by red circle in Fig. 1, channel 27
became occupied. Due to the limited number of sensing nodes
and restricted licence for accessing TVWS, channel 27 was cor-
rupted randomly among different time slots in order to simulate
the random distribution of corrupted values among the matrix at
the FC. In the following, the proposed malicious user detection
framework is tested by real-world signals collected during the
trial.
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In this case, the same channel is sensed by SUs collected at
J = 50 different time slots. Malicious users appear in channel
27 randomly among the 50 time slots. Fig. 14 shows the detec-
tion probability Pd and the false alarm probability Pf of the pro-
posed malicious user detection algorithm with varying compres-
sion ratios γ. The detection performance comparison is demon-
strated for the cases with and without malicious users in the CSS
network. When there are no malicious users in the CSS network,
we can see that the perfect detection performance (Pd = 1.0 and
Pf = 0.0) can be achieved by choosing the suitable threshold
according to (12) for decision making. If malicious users show
up in the CSS network, the false alarm probability Pf becomes
higher than the case without malicious users, because a false
alarm happens if the corrupted value on channel 27 over TVWS
is not removed properly during MC process. It is further noticed
that the false alarm probability Pf does not reach 0 when there
are malicious users in the CSS network. This is caused by the as-
sumption in the proposed framework that the corrupted channels
are assumed to be sparsely and randomly distributed among the
sensed channels collected at the FC. This assumption is reason-
able and practical as malicious users can show up anywhere and
interpolate any channel. However, in the trial, only channel 27
among the 40 TV channels can be corrupted randomly due to the
license limitation. The slight behaviour difference of malicious
users in the real-world signals causes inexact MC, by utilizing
the proposed framework for malicious user detection. Thus, as
shown in Fig. 14, the higher Pf is found in comparison with
the benchmark (the case without malicious users). However, we
can still observe that Pf gets closer to the benchmark with the
increasing compression ratio γ, as the recovery error becomes
smaller when higher number of sensed channels are available
at the FC. This trend matches the simulation results presented
in Fig. 10.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a low-rank matrix completion
(MC) based malicious user detection framework for the se-
cure cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) networks. As each
SU only sensed part of the whole spectrum, the costs of data
acquisition at SUs were reduced significantly. Meanwhile, a
malicious user detection algorithm was proposed by adopt-
ing the adaptive outlier pursuit (AOP) algorithm, in which the
channels corrupted by malicious users were removed during
the MC process. Additionally, a rank estimation algorithm and
an estimation strategy for the number of corrupted channels
were proposed to provide inputs for the proposed malicious
user detection framework, in order to make it completely blind.
Furthermore, the proposed malicious user detection framework
was tested on both simulated signals and real-world signals
over TV white space spectrum. Numerical analyses showed
that the proposed framework alleviated the influences of mali-
cious users with lower data acquisition cost at each individual
SU. It can be concluded that the proposed malicious user de-
tection framework is a strong candidate for the secure CSS
networks.
APPENDIX
The key notations in this paper are summarized in Table I.
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